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survive that give them a strong mind-independence, race is
nevertheless independent of our will insofar as once racial
categories have been created, they take on a life of their
own that forms an inescapable material basis for human
praxis within that racialized context characterized by the
normalization of the white body. Mills’s essay ultimately
both serves as an accessible and well-argued introduction
to the theme of this volume, as well as building upon and
elaborating themes from his own significant body of work
in the philosophy of race.
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In Living Alterities, Emily Lee has assembled an engaging
and stimulating collection of essays written by leading
philosophers of race working within, or at least sympathetic
to, the phenomenological tradition. The particular thematic
focus, as the subtitle makes clear, is on the significance
of embodiment for our theorization of race and racism.
As Lee points out in her introduction, there is a tendency
to understand race as all in the mind in philosophical
discussions of the topic—the body is there at best only
passively, as that upon which race is imposed by misguided
or malicious minds. Lee turns to phenomenology here
precisely because it is a tradition characterized by its
approach to and emphasis on embodiment. The essays
overall thus take seriously the way in which subjectivity
is always embodied in such a way that consciousness is
shaped constitutively by that embodiment. In the case
of a deeply racialized world, this means that race is not
simply a product of consciousness but is importantly prior
to consciousness. As Lee puts the point, the aim of the
volume is to theorize “how the meanings circumscribing
embodiment construct the experiences the subject
encounters and consequently how the subject develops
certain emotions, knowledge, ethical/moral postures, and
sense of being-in-the-world” (7). This means that race
“does not lie as a superficial cover over the primary later
of common humanity” (7), and suggests that it is important
to explore the possibility of “positive, identity-affirming
reasons to recognize distinguishable bodily differences”
(6). The eleven essays in this volume work together to
explore this general theme, and the volume overall offers
an important and refreshing intervention into the ongoing
philosophical theorization of race and racism.
Charles Mills offers the first contribution to this collection
of essays with his “Materializing Race.” Mills has never
worked, nor claimed to work, in the phenomenological
tradition, and this essay is no exception. Nevertheless,
his text sets the stage nicely for what is to come and
provides a kind of “soft landing,” so to speak, for readers
interested in race and embodiment but less familiar with
phenomenology. Beginning from the Marxist appeal to
class as a sociopolitical material, Mills raises the question
of whether race can be understood to have a similar
materiality. Drawing from feminist efforts to draw upon
relations of reproduction as the material basis for gender,
Mills argues that “from the modern period onward (when
race comes into existence), race is indeed material in that
it is because of race that one is entitled to or debarred
from the ‘normal’ treatment extended to white humans”
(34). While class and gender, unlike race, have a basis in
our fundamental need for production and reproduction to
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In contrast to Mills, George Yancy’s work has always been
deeply informed by the phenomenological tradition
(especially the work of Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and
Fanon), and has thus been squarely focused on issues of
embodiment with regard to race. Yancy’s contribution to
this volume is primarily a summary and recapitulation of
some of the major themes from his prior work, including
his emphasis on the ways in which racialized bodies are
constituted as such through the intentional acts (gazes) of
agents whose own agency is itself conditioned by their
own racialized bodies. Within a racist social context (an
anti-black world), this means that white bodies and thus
white perspectives are normalized, valorized, and affirmed,
while non-white bodies and perspectives are pathologized,
marginalized, and denigrated. Yancy revisits vignettes
familiar to those who have studied his work, including his
examples of the elevator ride and the click of car doors
locking, and creates what is a succinct and rich survey
of this prior work. While this is valuable, he concludes
the chapter by offering a new, though brief, discussion
of crisis in relation to racialized embodiment, especially
as it pertains to whiteness. If racism aims to normalize
racist hierarchies and white-supremacist modes of being
(embodiment), then perhaps one aspect of resistance to
this process is to generate conditions of discomfort and
crisis. “For the most part,” Yancy points out, “white people
are not in crisis vis-à-vis their whiteness; they are under
constant therapeutic reprieve, assured that there is nothing
problematic about whiteness, about their white selves” (62).
As a consequence, crises of discomfort that problematize
whiteness can be viewed as a positive prescription for antiracism. Yancy’s essay is a valuable introduction to his work
for those who are not already familiar with it, as well as
presenting a new development of his thought for those
who have experience with his prior work.
Donna-Dale Marcano turns to a meta-philosophical reflection
on the place (or lack thereof) of black women within the
discipline (both as an institution/profession and as a body
of thought) in the third chapter. Drawing from feminist
philosophy’s argument for the male-ness of philosophy,
Marcano builds an intersectional analysis that makes a
clear case for ongoing systematic erasure of black women
from the discipline. As she puts the point, “I contend that
the interlocking and multiple oppressions faced by Black
women in American history acts to inhibit the inclusion of
their intellectual work as philosophical and philosophically
relevant because they are Black and women” (68). While
making a very compelling case for this claim, Marcano is
careful to argue that the appropriate response is not simply
to ignore race and gender in our philosophical practices,
as if blackness and femaleness were simply superficial
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coverings of an essentially genderless and raceless
philosopher. Rather, she urges a deep diversification of the
discipline that should be manifest not only in terms of the
texts we cite and teach in our courses but also in terms
of the actual bodies that constitute our ranks. Marcano’s
contribution is ideal for use in philosophy courses, offering
as it does a brief but compelling summary of the state of
the discipline and argument for radical intervention.
The fourth essay in this volume, Namita Goswami’s “Among
Family Women,” returns to the debates within postcolonial
feminism surrounding Sati, but with an important and
innovative discussion of the relation between culture and
the body. Goswami begins with the claim, common within
postcolonial feminist discourses but all too uncommon
outside of them, that there is a pronounced “‘first world’
privilege” in much feminist theory, such that “‘Western’
women emerge as the true subjects of feminism while
‘third world’ women are relegated to perpetual objectstatus” (80). The people of the so-called third world thus
remain cast in the role of nature to Western culture. From
this relatively familiar starting point, Goswami notes that
there is a deep irony operating here that connects in an
interesting way with embodiment. The way in which socalled third-world women are relegated to the role of
object/nature is in part through the exercise of certain
cultural practices and traditions (such as sati) that become
overdetermined as barbaric. At the same time, the nature/
culture divide rests on an emphasis on the human body
as the organic embodiment of our “exceptionalism” visà-vis the natural world. Thus, some cultural practices
are disassociated from the “natural” world and properly
human, while others are understood as inextricably bound
up with and expressions of the natural world, and Goswami
draws two important implications from this. First, one way
in which these different cultural practices are distinguished
is not through the content of the practices themselves
but rather through the kinds of bodies that undertake
them, and second, this underlying irony of an embodied
disassociation from the natural points to the need to
radically critique the very distinction between the natural
and the cultural that underlies so much of the (post)colonial
relation. Goswami’s essay offers a compelling exploration
of these implications.
David Kim’s contribution is a thoughtful and challenging
exploration of specificity of Asian American relations to
whiteness. Arguing first that the common “model minority”
and assimilationist tropes “conceal and mystify” and
ongoing subordination of Asian Americans, Kim focuses
on the way in which this subordination shapes the agency
of Asian Americans, especially insofar as it generates
shame and other emotions connected with negative selfevaluation. It is this focus on emotions that brings Kim
to the topic of embodiment, for he stresses the idea that
“emotion is a feeling through the body to what matters in
the world,” and as such, they “are world-constituting in
addition to being world-disclosing” (115). Drawing from
empirical studies that focus in particular on Asian American
identification with whiteness and efforts to affirm distance
from those “fresh off the boat,” Kim’s essay is not only
an important analysis racialized embodiment in the U.S.
context but an implicit argument for the importance of
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attending to the specificities of particular racialized groups
(and bodies) as opposed to the one-size-fits-all tradition of
the black/white binary.
Drawing on the phenomenological work of Merleau-Ponty
and Bergson (among others), Alia Al-Saji offers an account
of what she refers to as the “intransigent and closed
logic” of racializing vision and the ways and means of its
interruption (133). If vision is not a mere passive reception
of the visible but rather involves “constitutive operations”
that differentially render visible and invisible (and
emphasize or marginalize) according to a complex network
of sedimentation habituation (138), and racialization is
a crucial aspect of that habitual network, then racialized
perception “circumscribes and configures what is seen,
so that the realm of visual objectivity is narrower than the
historicity and social structure on which it relies” (139).
Because these modes of seeing (and not-seeing) are
a matter of embodied habits, they have an importantly
affective dimension to such an extent that “affect and
perception form two sides of the same phenomenon,
linking that which is seen as racialized to its immediately
felt effects on the racializing body” (140). Al-Saji’s important
move here is to draw our attention to the ways in which
encounters that disrupt racialized visual habits, moments
characterized by “hesitation,” can be a crucial component
of efforts to disrupt those habits. She carefully differentiates
between the all-too-common moments of hesitation on
the part of the oppressed generated by those racialized
habits that inhibit agency and action on the one hand,
and the less common moments of “responsive hesitation”
that “[loosen] the net of internalized determinism and
stereotype” (154). She persuasively argues that sustained
generation of such moments of hesitation is an important
(and perhaps necessary) aspect of any successful effort to
disrupt racialized perception (and thus racism).
Mariana Ortega takes up the work of María Lugones to
explore the phenomenology of “home” in relation to
ambiguous, even multiplicitous, notions of self in the
seventh chapter. As an exercise of what she refers to as
“self-mapping” (173), Ortega begins with the problematic
relationship to “belonging” engendered by the notion of
home, especially insofar as the concepts of home and
belonging are inherently bound up with conditions of
identity. The phenomenology of home—the experience
of a place or even an experience as familiar, comfortable,
and significantly mine, is in large part a matter of
standing in a real or imagined relation to those who are
like me in a particular sense, and an exclusion of those
who are not. Histories of colonialism, exile, oppression,
sexism, and racism (among others), however, generate
conditions wherein this experience of home and the self
is complicated and modified such that it is ambiguous,
multiplicitous, and even contradictory. Rather than see this
as inherently problematic, Ortega takes up the challenge
of abandoning the project of an integrated and unitary
self (and thus an unambiguous sense of belonging) and
finding a way to affirm, or at least live with, that ambiguity
and contradiction. To advance this project, she introduces
“hometactics,” which are “everyday practices in which we
literally ‘make do’ with what we have, [and] do not form
a robust sense of belonging or familiarity” (185). Ortega’s
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essay points provocatively toward an open-ended process
of constant negotiation and renegotiation of home(s) and
the relations that constitute belonging.
The eighth chapter is Edward Casey’s theorization of
the concepts of borders and boundaries as they relate
an actual border—that between the United States and
Mexico (la Frontera). Beginning with a general account of
edges, Casey quickly focuses in on a contrast between
boundary and border. While both borders and boundaries
“act to demarcate a given place or region,” a border “is
a clearly and crisply delineated entity, and is established
by conventional agreements such as treaties or laws,”
while a boundary, in contrast, “is rarely demarcated with
any precision, varying in contour and extent depending
on environmental or historical circumstances” (192).
Furthermore, while boundaries are porous and lacking in
“exact positioning,” borders are impermeable and exist in
a precise and exact location. To be clear, the distinction
is largely heuristic, for Casey (rightly, in my view), does
not think any actual border exists as he has described it.
Indeed, borders, he tells us, “are ideal and eidetic” (199),
brought into (pseudo) existence by human convention, the
aim of which is first and foremost a distinction between us
on this side, and them beyond the border. Casey observes,
however, that “borders are always already in the process of
becoming boundaries” (202), such that every effort to fix
an impermeable and stable border begins immediately to
slip beyond our grasp, becoming porous and ambiguous.
Armed with this set of theoretical developments, Casey turns
to la Frontera, the border between the United States and
Mexico. The conclusion of his essay is a careful elucidation
of the way in which the border as an ideal aims to police
racialized bodies in a way that preserves a mythologized
purity on either side, and that the reality of la Frontera as a
boundary reveals the way in which the racialized bodies on
both sides act to dispel that myth.
In her essay, “Pride and Prejudice: Ambiguous Racial,
Religious, and Ethnic Identities of Jewish Bodies,” Gail
Weiss takes on the work of Sander Gilman, Jean-Paul
Sartre, and Frantz Fanon on anti-Semitism and Jewish
identity. In particular, she offers a critical engagement with
their claim that Jewish identity is ultimately a matter of the
ways in which society at large (and anti-Semitic societies
in particular) perceives and portrays Jewish bodies. Both
Gilman and Sartre are concerned, in particular, with the
ways in which Jews internalize anti-Semitic attitudes and
negative stereotypes, and Weiss is expecially interested
in the way in which this internalization is embodied into
what she refers to as the “intercorporeal dimensions of
Jewish experience” (214). This is an important feature, she
argues, but to grant the (hostile) other the ability to define
one’s identity undermines the agency of the oppressed.
Furthermore, it disavows what Weiss considers the inherent
ambiguity of identities; ambiguities that “can and should
be seen as productive possibilities, expanding the range
of potential ways one can access, engage, and ultimately
transform Jewish experience” (218). Weiss’s contribution
is provocative and points toward promising avenues of
further theoretical development.
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In the penultimate essay, Emily Lee turns to white
embodiment and, specifically, the question of
responsibility in relation to the privileges bestowed by
that white embodiment. Lee begins with Merleau-Ponty’s
account of the way in which bodily movement “generates
phenomenological space and time” (233) to help provide
an account of freedom as a responsibility for the entirety
of one’s situation, including significantly aspects of one’s
situation that one may simply have inherited. That is,
because the body “possesses an immediate intertwining
with the world” (237) that is conditioned by “motivational
relations (242)” in which a given subject’s actions are
bound up within a temporal and physical horizon that
both conditions and is conditioned by those actions, it
becomes necessary, if we are to account for freedom and
responsibility, to become response-able to that situational
horizon. As Lee puts the point, “All human beings can
reason, but, from a series of past decisions [not always their
own past decisions], they develop into subjects who utilize
their reason in varying complex ways” (244). This means
that racialized subjectivity, including white subjectivity, is
an integral part of a given agent’s sense of self for which
one must take responsibility if one is to realize one’s
autonomy as an agent. Though she only offers this point
as a concluding suggestion, Lee makes it clear that such
“taking responsibility” cannot be a strictly epistemic or
intellectual undertaking, but must itself be embodied, and
include “developing and accumulating different and new
body movements” (248).
Linda Alcoff’s essay on “The Future of Whiteness” is a
challenging conclusion to this text with broad implications
for the phenomenology of race. The framing question
arises because of the way in which dominant discourses
on race, both inside and outside of philosophy, tend to
see whiteness as a kind of ontological lynchpin for racism,
such that any commitment to antiracism must entail a
commitment to the elimination of whiteness as such. This
general line of argument holds that a just future must
be one in which there is no such thing as the white race.
Confronting this question at the end of this volume is an
important moment, for it highlights the way in which the
usual approach to race and racism cannot be maintained
within the phenomenological tradition. Phenomenology
foregrounds embodied consciousness and the reflexive
interplay between that embodied/historically situated
subjectivity and the larger social/material world, while
rejecting an abstract, featureless (liberal) subject.
Consequently, it must call into question the assumption
that racialized subjects, including white subjects, must
shed their racial specificity, and ask whether there are
“any useful first-person insights that might provide a
re-visioning of possibilities toward a changed national
landscape that would include whites as whites” (262). Just
as Weiss’s essay takes up the way in which Jewish identity
is not reducible to the view that anti-Semites have of Jews,
Alcoff is here arguing that white identity is not reducible
to white supremacy. Whiteness must, she holds, revise
itself substantially, but this is different from calling for its
elimination or abolition. Alcoff’s phenomenological project
here is an important one and an excellent way to conclude
this volume.
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The essays assembled in this text comprise a significant
contribution both to phenomenology and to the
philosophical study of race and racism. Lee has brought
together an impressive array of scholars offering a diverse
set of approaches and topics, but yet they are all clearly
united under the thematic umbrella of a shared commitment
to thinking through racialized embodiment. A particular
strength of this text as an anthology, and of great credit to
Lee as editor, is the way in which the essays collected here
not only stand up as individual pieces but hang together so
very well as a whole. The book should thus be of interest to
scholars and students of phenomenology and to theorists
of race and racism sympathetic to phenomenological
approaches to the topic. It is a timely and important
collection of scholarship.
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Emily Lee’s edited volume Living Alterities brings
together important contributions by philosophers of race
in a text that consistently centers embodiment through
phenomenological approaches. It will be a significant text
for scholarship in these fields and as assigned reading for
undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy across
continental and analytic approaches. The richness, breadth,
and depth of the offerings in this anthology constitute a
rare achievement because they find new ways to make
old and still necessary critiques, as they also find ways
to name new and emerging phenomena with regard to
race, white supremacy, and change. Several of the essays
in this collection are grappling with the presumed “post
race” conditions of our current U.S. American moment.
This problematic context is perhaps best summed up by
Kimberlé Crenshaw Williams’s rejection of what she called
the “vulgarized social construction thesis,” which follows
a logic that since categories such as race and gender are
constructed, it does not make sense to continue theorizing
on these categories (Crenshaw, 1296).1 Philosophers of race
struggle with the realities of race and the material, bodily,
social, political, economic, and psychological conditions
it produces, grappling with the dominant culture’s and
philosophy’s lack of accountability for the ways race is real,
even if it is not biologically real. The contributors to this
volume successfully continue these interventions.
One of the most successful elements of the anthology as
a whole is its organization. Rather than having “parts” with
headings, Lee has organized the book as a kind of unfolding
of key related ideas and themes, as I will try to show. Thus,
in what follows, I will address the volume in its chronological
chapter progression while highlighting important thematic
connections. More specifically, while whiteness and white
FALL 2015 | VOLUME 15 | NUMBER 1

supremacy are addressed throughout in various ways,
whiteness studies as a field that centers questions of
whiteness is engaged in the final two chapters of the book;
whiteness comes last. As Lee notes in her Introduction, the
early chapters emphasize the materiality of race and its
embodiment (Mills; Yancy). The chapters that follow take up
phenomenology and phenomenological exercises in varying
ways, but with different emphases such as race, gender,
and postcoloniality (Marcano; Goswami), hesitation (Al-Saji),
assimiliationist demands (Kim), mapping and belonging
(Ortega), ambiguities of race and ethnicity of Jewish bodies
(Weiss), and, finally, individual white responsibility and the
future of whiteness (Lee; Alcoff).
In chapter one, “Materializing Race,” Charles W. Mills
rejects a Marxist racial eliminativism, which locates race at
the superstructural level, as ideological, and not existing
at the base level of materiality. Engaging Alcoff’s work in
Visible Identities, he situates gender as having a basis in
biological reproductive difference, whereas race has no
such basis. Ultimately, he argues for an understanding of
a nonbiological, rather sociopolitical, materially originating
apparatus of race, which is a useful conception. It seems
indisputable that race is real, material, and bodily, for all
its social and political constructedness. I appreciate Mills’s
gesture to socialize materiality. That said, I wonder which
audiences, who are not otherwise compelled as to the
realness and constructedness of race, would be convinced
of these assertions by a revisioning of Marxist materialism.
My concern is that this form of materialism forces Mills
into the terrain of deciding what is the base, or the natural,
thus requiring that even if gender is not natural, sex and its
biological reproductive determinations are.
In “White Gazes: What It Feels Like to Be an Essence”
(chapter two), George Yancy begins by inviting readers
into his classroom, so to speak, using scenarios with
predominantly white students to offer the kinds of
practices that put whiteness in crisis. A central assertion
is that whiteness is opaque to itself; white people are
opaque to themselves, and thus the crisis is offered as a
moment of decision, a valuable condition for white people
to have to inhabit and which needs to happen more often.
This is Yancy’s refusal to allow the bad faith of whiteness
to continue on unchecked in his classrooms, in elevators,
and in all other spaces. At the very least, when whiteness
is put into crisis, the moment of decision is brought to the
fore: white people in this instance have decisions to make
about whether to change or remain the same. Of particular
pedagogical interest, with broader implications for why we
do philosophy, is Yancy’s term explaining white students’
desires for/to do philosophy. Philosophy is often thought
of as “high-falutin conceptual bullshit,” as “something they
can learn about without any deeply personal demands
made on them” (44). Yancy disallows this kind of abstraction
for the student and for the philosopher.
Donna-Dale L. Marcano’s “Race/Gender and the
Philosopher’s Body” (chapter three) follows nicely after
Yancy’s piece, making a neat and tidy rejection of the
“supersensibility” of philosophy—its claims to be beyond
the limitations and specificities of embodiment. Refusing
philosophy’s claims to transcendence of any kind, she
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